Despite the negative attention that Guantánamo continues to receive because of its infamous detention/interrogation center, most critics are only vaguely aware that it is also a unique naval base that has served U.S. and Caribbean interests for almost 110 years. It facilitated the liberation of Cuba from Spain in the War of 1898. For decades thereafter it protected Caribbean waters from hostile incursions by expansionist European powers, in particular Germany during World Wars I and II. It became a major training facility for American seamen and marines, especially during winter months when it was the harbor for the entire Atlantic Fleet. And, from the early 1900s until today, ships have deployed from Guantánamo to provide disaster relief and to rescue refugees and migrants on flimsy crafts from drowning at sea.

It was the outpouring of Cubans and Haitians into the Florida straits in the early 1990s that led to Guantánamo’s transformation into an incarceration center for people whom the U.S. government did not want to admit immediately to America’s shores. With U.S. Coast Guard ships filled with potential refugees, the White House decided to warehouse these people for an indeterminate period at Guantánamo. Both the first Bush and Clinton administrations acted on the advice of the Justice Department that, because Guantánamo is leased from Cuba and the U.S. military exercises sole authority there, individuals detained at Guantánamo could be denied access to legal counsel and other benefits of Due Process. Even though the U.S. Supreme Court, by a majority vote, eventually upheld a lower court’s decision to extend constitutional privileges to the Haitians, the question--does Due Process apply to Guantánamo?—persists as a subject of political debate.

While many Americans know that the United States has not had full diplomatic relations with Cuba for almost fifty years, only a few fully appreciate the reality that Guantánamo ceased to be a major point of bilateral friction more than a decade ago. The reduction in tensions began in 1995 when the United States agreed to a request to return most Cubans who tried to enter the base illegally or were picked up at sea by the Coast Guard. The agreement was based on the understanding that the Cuban government would not punish these migrants for their failed attempt to enter U.S. territory. To work out the modalities of repatriation and to reduce frictions along the so-called “fenceline” that separates Guantánamo from Cuba, the senior local Cuban military commander would meet with the commander of Guantánamo and a senior U.S. State Department official on a monthly basis at a former barracks just inside the northeast entrance to the base. The Cuban government justified this initiative as follows: “that military enclave [Guantánamo] is the exact place where American and Cuban soldiers stand face to face [and] thus the place where serenity and responsibility are most required.”

Although these bilateral talks focus exclusively on Guantánamo-specific concerns, some of the decisions are not only important, but impressive—given the hostility that persists between the two national governments. The Cuban government quickly agreed to a request to permit U.S. military aircraft to utilize a limited portion of Cuban airspace for take-offs and landings at Guantánamo. Prior to this concession, U.S. planes had to navigate a hazardous beeline between the base and international waters, but when the issue was first broached, the local commander responded that it was not in his nation’s interest for military aircraft to crash on Cuban soil. In a similar cooperative spirit, the Cubans have agreed that, in the event of serious brush fires along the fenceline, any burn victims—regardless of whether they were Cuban or U.S. soldiers would be quickly airlifted to the burn unit at the hospital in Guantánamo City, Cuba. Needless to say, Cuban or American sentries would be quickly and severely punished by their respective militaries for making hostile gestures or remarks to their counterparts, and thus they no longer occur. As the Cuban Foreign Ministry has observed, “what prevails [at Guantánamo] today is an atmosphere of calm.”

If and when diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States improve significantly, the question “What will happen to Guantánamo?” must be addressed. It is almost certain that Guantánamo would be one of the most important bargaining chips in any negotiations aimed at a normalization of bilateral relations. The reasons for this are both historic and current, given the fact that the Platt Amendment’s provision that the United States would either buy or lease naval stations in Cuba was foisted on Cuba’s Constitutional Assembly in 1901 and President Theodore Roosevelt dictated the terms for leasing Guantánamo in perpetuity in 1903. Even though the lease agreement states explicitly that Cuba is ultimately sovereign, neither Spain nor Cuba has exercised effective sovereignty over this portion of its territory.

And yet, there is the possibility that Guantánamo might, at some future date, serve broader naval needs than those of the United States. A former U.S. Ambassador to Cuba voiced the hope that someday the status of Guantánamo might be modified to give Cuba a participatory role “similar to that enjoyed by our NATO allies in American bases on European soil.” If calmer minds could prevail and exercise the same kind of rational judgment currently evident in the fenceline talks, a version of this optimistic vision could, perhaps, become a reality and enable Guantánamo to serve broader Caribbean needs.