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Sheldon Richman

Michael Lind writes at Salon.com: “Having denounced liberals as crypto communists for half a century during the Cold War, the American right now routinely accuses the center-left of being fascist.” Lind goes on to wonder why “American conservatives and libertarians” have avoided discussion of their own “heroes” who seem to have been soft on fascists. He specifically mentions Ludwig von Mises’s remarks about the Italian Fascists in the 1920s (in his book Liberalism) and F. A. Hayek’s and Milton Friedman’s alleged approval of Augusto Pinochet’s “free market” dictatorship in Chile.

The first thing I want to say is that by putting libertarianism on the right and linking it with conservatism, Lind indicates that his knowledge of the libertarian movement is rather superficial. Philosophically the differences are too fundamental to permit such a mistake in a conscientious observer. If libertarianism belongs anywhere, it is on the left.

Lind’s article contains much to comment on, but here I want to make just one or two points. Even if Mises, Hayek, and Friedman really approved of fascist regimes (one can disagree with them while maintaining that things aren’t quite so simple), it would take more than that to indict libertarianism. Lind never explains why this alleged record doesn’t merely reflect on the particular named individuals who for one reason or another departed from their stated libertarian principles.

After all, what is there in libertarianism that would incline an adherent to feel the least sympathy for fascist dictators? Certainly nothing obvious.

The closest Lind gets to answering that question is his pointing out that libertarians dislike democracy, the implication being that one who dislikes democracy necessarily likes autocracy. That’s a strange argument indeed, as Roderick Long points out here. As Long writes, “[L]ibertarians don’t oppose democracy (in the conventional sense) because they hanker after autocracy; they oppose democracy because it is too much like autocracy.”

It’s not as though there are no alternatives to democracy and autocracy. How about market anarchism, where majorities don’t rule minorities and minorities don’t rule majorities? And libertarian minarchists can say to Lind that they accept democratic decision-making but only in the smallest area necessary, while otherwise opposing rule by both majorities and minorities.

Lind commits a major gaffe by taking democracy at face value; it seems not to have occurred to him that democracy might not be exactly what it is purported to be. Indeed, it has long been argued that a façade of majoritarianism typically masks a form of aristocracy, or minority rule. The historian Edmund Morgan refers to this as the fiction of representation. I discuss Morgan’s thesis here.

Had Lind not swallowed the civics-book hype and understood that democracy is not actually rule by the people, he might have sized libertarianism up differently.


Tuesday, August 30, 2011 - 20:30


Sheldon Richman

 

While inflation hawks understandably keep a close watch on the Federal Reserve’s money-creation activities, an equally worrisome Fed activity is taking place right under their noses. Under cover of addressing the financial crisis and recession, the Fed has become the central allocator of credit.

 

As San Jose State University economics professor Jeffrey Rogers Hummel points out in The Independent Review (Spring 2011), Fed chairman Ben Bernanke “has so expanded the Fed’s discretionary actions beyond merely controlling the money stock that it has become a gigantic, financial central planner.... [T]he Fed that emerged from the crisis is no longer the same as the Fed before the crisis.”

 

Read the full op-ed, "Federal Reserve Grabs New Powers." 


Monday, August 29, 2011 - 15:28


Roderick T. Long

Sheldon has a nice post on why proper individualism is not atomistic – wherein he cites Aristotle, Spencer, and … me!

In related news, I’ve argued elsewhere that it is the least atomistic forms of individualism that have the strongest claim to be called radical individualism.


Saturday, August 27, 2011 - 16:07


Roderick T. Long

 

I agree with most of what Walter Williams says here, so let me churlishly focus on the bit I disagree with:

You might say, “Williams, while there are gray areas in the Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court would never brazenly rule against clear constitutional prohibitions!” That’s nonsense. The first clause of Article 1, Section 10 mandates that “No State shall … pass any … Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” During the Great Depression, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota law that restricted the ability of banks to foreclose on overdue mortgages, thereby impairing contracts made between lender and borrower. To prevent this kind of contract impairment – routinely done under the Articles of Confederation – was precisely why the Framers added the clause.

Lysander Spooner

I agree, of course, that the Supreme Court has little compunction about overriding “clear constitutional prohibitions.” But I don’t think the example Williams has chosen proves his case. To uphold the obligation of a contract does not mean to uphold whatever the contract says; otherwise contracts to sell oneself into slavery, or contracts to assassinate another person, would be legitimately enforceable. Thus contracting to do X is not by itself sufficient to incur an enforceable obligation to do X.

And as Lysander Spooner argues:

“The obligation of contracts,” here spoken of, is, of necessity, the natural obligation; for that is the only real or true obligation that any contracts can have.

The court’s decision in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell thus counts as violating the constitutional prohibition on impairing the obligation of contracts only if those contracts were legitimately enforceable under natural law. Now maybe they were and maybe they weren’t; that moral question is not my current concern. My point is simply that one cannot determine whether the court violated the constitution in this case without addressing that moral question; it’s not something that one can simply read off the words.  

.


Thursday, August 25, 2011 - 22:48


Robert Higgs

Once upon a time in a land far, far away, there was a country famous for its apples. In fact, it produced nothing but apples and so was called Appleonia. The people ate many apples in many different ways: raw apples, baked apples, apple pies, apple fritters, and candied apples, to name just a few. They found lots of different ways to use their apples, even as fuel.

But Appleonians didn’t consume all of their apples. They saved lots and lots of apples for their seeds so they could enlarge their orchards and grow more and more. For hundreds of years, the Appleonians consumed lots of apples and made their orchards bigger and bigger. Everyone in Appleonia worked in the apple business and prospered.

It turned out though that not every place in Appleonia was perfect for growing apples. Some areas were filled with worms that just loved apples. Little by little, the worms began to infest the orchards. No one noticed until one day a young boy opened a barrel and, taking a big bite out of an apple, bit right into a worm. Undeterred, he picked up another, with the same result, and another and another. At last he found an apple that was as good inside as it was outside.

But word spread quickly that there were worms in the apples and that the worms seemed to be spreading from orchard to orchard. People quit harvesting in the infested areas and, even worse, they could no longer guarantee the high quality of their apples as they had in the past. For the first time, they produced fewer apples, and many people were put out of work.

The Appleonian government grew very worried and, after brief consultation with academic experts, came up with an idea. To put people back to work and restore faith in the apples, the government hired lots of people to polish all the rotten apples. Of course, this didn’t really work: the polished apples may have looked better on the outside, but they were still rotten on the inside. Things didn’t get any better. People were still out of work, and the quality of the apples was still hit and miss. Government officials came up with another plan. They hired another bunch of people to spray a thin layer of wax on the rotten apples. Again, their remedy was superficial: the bad apples may have looked gorgeous, but they were still rotten on the inside, and hence worthless.

The people in the government never realized that nothing short of sorting carefully through the barrels, identifying the rotten apples and throwing them out, would set things right in Appleonia’s orchards. Pouring money into efforts to beautify worm-filled apples didn’t really help; it simply prolonged the difficulty.

Here in our own time and place, we can learn an important lesson from the story of Appleonia. A simple parable cannot clarify all of the important issues involved in our situation, but it can help us to see one of its critical aspects.

Appelonia’s rotten apples are analogous to the unsound enterprises that people created during the boom prior to 2008―the houses and shopping centers that could not be sold, the mortgage loans that would not be repaid, the countless complementary investments that were made in order to take advantage of the real estate and construction run-up. These projects were, in effect, worm-infested. When the bust came, the pressing need was to liquidate them as quickly as possible, so that they would not cause other, good apples to be ruined and, especially, so that resources currently employed in maintaining and polishing them would be released for employment in the production of sound fruit that people actually value and will voluntarily pay for.

Unfortunately, for the past eighty years, liquidationist thinking has been discredited among the elites who make economic policy decisions in the United States and other economically advanced countries. Adherence to the loss-and-bankruptcy part of a profit-and-loss system is said to be cruel in politics and unsound in economics. Yet, as we gaze back on the past few years, one has to wonder: has the currently prevailing orthodoxy in economic theory and policy making proved to be a raving success? Even a brief look at what has happened recently ought to raise serious questions about the soundness of the ideas advanced by the best and brightest in the intelligentsia and the upper reaches of the policy-making elite.

During the past three years, the U.S. economy has taken a dive and, in some important ways, remained more or less submerged since it hit bottom. According to the latest government estimates, real GDP fell about 5 percent between its peak in the fourth quarter of 2007 and its trough in the second quarter of 2009. Since then it has recovered slowly, but only back to approximately the same level it had attained at its pre-recession peak. Thus, nothing has been gained during the past three and a half years.

Other aspects of the economy, however, look even worse. Unemployment, as measured by the Labor Department’s most widely cited index, has been stuck at 9-10 percent of the civilian labor force for more than two years.

Rate of Unemployment (%)

Making matters worse, long-term unemployment has increased greatly, as has part-time work by persons who say they would rather have full-time jobs. The Labor Department’s index of aggregate weekly hours worked by private employees fell by about 10 percent between June 2007 and October 2009. Although this index has increased a bit since then, in July 2011 it remained 6.6 percent below its previous peak.

Keynesians advise that in such circumstances, the federal government should increase its spending for final goods and services, and the government has taken this advice to heart with a vengeance. Real federal spending for consumption and gross investment goods increased by 18 percent between the fourth quarter of 2007 and the third quarter of 2010. Although this kind of spending has declined slightly in the past three quarters, it remained in the second quarter of 2011 almost 15 percent greater than it was in the fourth quarter of 2007.

So, we have had Keynesian stimulus aplenty, but the effects have fallen far short of putting the millions of unemployed workers back to work and propelling the economy to a high-employment rate of output. Recent economic conditions indicate that even the paltry recovery that has occurred may be petering out, and many economic prognosticators foresee another steep dive in the near-term future. Doctrinaire Keynesians insist that the economy needs a bigger dose of government deficit spending to recover fully, but less doctrinaire observers conclude that the various stimulus actions have simply failed. More important, perhaps, lenders who have financed the government’s recent spending binge are losing faith in the government’s ability to repay as promised, given the rapid recent run-up in total government indebtedness to the public.

No one is reassured, of course, by the idea that if private investors, sovereign lenders, and foreign central banks won’t continue to bankroll Uncle Sam’s profligacy, the Fed will do so. QE1 and QE2 have come and gone, with no greater success in bringing about recovery than the rest of the government’s ever-changing hodgepodge of loans, guarantees, stimulus packages, bailouts, and takeovers, and its massive borrowing to pay for the whole frantic undertaking. If the government turns to the Fed to monetize its rapidly mounting debt, we can only fear all the more that accelerating general price inflation awaits us.

In light of the foregoing facts, a radical change in policy making seems well warranted.

In politics, however, incumbency counts for a great deal. Officeholders have rigged the system by gerrymandering and other tricks to help to ensure their reelection. Established interest-groups have supported and attached themselves to the president, members of Congress, and bureaucrats from whom they secure government assistance―privileges and subsidies for their members and statutes, regulations, and administrative rulings that hobble their competitors. When a recession occurs, many of those who fall into trouble are, in effect, rotten apples. Their projects and enterprises need to be liquidated if the entire economy is to make rapid, sustainable headway. Their political clout, however, virtually guarantees that they will get bailouts and other government assistance to keep them afloat. They may float for a while, to be sure, yet they are nonetheless rotten. And they are a continuing drag on the overall economy’s recovery.

Thus, we now have, among other things, millions of houses sitting unoccupied, thousands of commercial properties similarly unused, and trillions of dollars in mortgage-related securities and derivatives whose values remain extremely iffy. Much of this debris would have been cleared away already, but for the government’s TARP, its series of stimulus-spending packages, its takeovers of huge auto and financial companies, and the Fed’s corresponding actions to flood the financial system with liquidity and prop up banks and other firms deemed “too big to fail.” Many of these incumbent firms continue to operate, even though they ought to have passed through bankruptcy proceedings long ago. Many banks are little more than zombies, living only by transfusions of reserves from the Fed and investing in little besides U.S. government securities.

All of this amounts to a rotten-apple operation. The contents of the economic barrel are still a mess. If the government and the Fed continue to pour trillions of dollars into efforts that do nothing more than polish the rotten apples, the entire contents of the barrel will become less and less valuable over time. Keynesianism was a bogus theory from the start. Thinking about why the economy succeeds or fails in terms of a handful of economic aggregates conceals everything we need to know if we are truly to understand it. Supposed experts who can’t tell a good apple from a rotten one should be kept out of the orchard. They are not helping. Indeed, they have made matters much worse at this point than would have been the case if the government had done nothing at all to reverse the recession. 


Tuesday, August 23, 2011 - 20:03


Jonathan J. Bean

In response to my recent essay "Obama and Hoover: Two 'Smart' (Stupid) Presidents", one commenter did me the service of rehashing the old myths about the 1920s and the causes of the depression and how Herbert Hoover did little, FDR did a lot and Hoover has nothing in common with "Wonder Boy" Obama. (Coolidge dismissed Herbert Hoover as "Wonder Boy" and stated that all his "unsolicited" advice was "bad"). Those are all myths (except Coolidge did oppose Hoover's Progressive agenda).

The commenter also noted that I was working on the "housing bubble" (true) and claimed that the topic has been done already by studying the Florida real estate boom. The following response is worth repeating because the 1920s housing and construction bubble had a lot in common with the 2000s bubble. Florida, I argue, was a blip and insignificant compared to the nationwide overbuilding of housing.

Here is my revised response:

First, I never mentioned Florida at all—and that is on purpose. People mistake the far larger housing (and construction) bubble of 1921 onward for the Florida episode. In fact, the business press was constantly talking about how more mundane building (especially single-family homes) was booming with low rates and new “mortgage real estate bonds” packaged for sale as securities. When the bust came, they discovered that the appraisals inflated the value of the underlying mortgage. Government also played a role in the bust because foreclosure laws made it very difficult to remove people from homes (it could take up to 2 years). Sound familiar?

As for Hoover's macroeconomic impact in the 1920s: Granted, his many recommendations for a massive countercyclical approach in the 1920-1921 depression were ignored by Harding but Hoover pledged to act on them if he ever became President. Go to americanpresidency.org and read his speeches 1930 onward: he boasts that his administration, together with the Federal Reserve, would be the FIRST EVER to use an aggressive counter-cyclical approach to depression. And so it was.

From Peter Fearon’s War, Prosperity and Depression synthesis of the literature on those years:

“E. Cary Brown’s study of fiscal policy during the thirties found that if the spending of all branches of government was aggregated, the stimulating effect of fiscal policy was larger in 1931 than in any other year during the decade. If the federal budget alone is considered, the two-year period 1929-1931 was one of greater fiscal stimulus than any similar term during the entire 1930s.”!!! (Fearon, 125). You can find Brown’s study in American Economic Review (1956).

Or to put it in perspective: while GDP shrank from 103.6 billion in 1929 to $58.7 billion, total government spending increased from 11.68 billion to $12.44 billion. That is a nominal increase in the face of massive deflation. Translation: a substantial real increase in spending (after deflation). Thus, it's no accident that Herbert Stein's Presidential Economics starts the first substantive chapter with the title "Hoover and Roosevelt: The Depression Origins of Liberal Economics."

On the importance of housing to the general business cycle, including the Great Depression, see recent works by Edward Leamer, “Housing IS the Business Cycle” (NBER paper; see also "Housing and Cars: Why are the Cycles to Similar?"). Economists are turning to what the business press saw and wrote about in the 1920s and early 1930s: “It’s housing, stupid!” That is a new interpretation and it is not in the historical literature. Historians have focused singlemindedly on the stock market. What they fail to understand is how deeply many financial institutions were invested in real estate and construction—and that started to crest in 1925 and then plummet in 1928. MANY observers saw it as the precipitating cause of the stock market crash. In 1931, one business reporter noted that in the Greater NYC area, savings banks were invested 60-70% in construction, life insurance company assets were 40% construction, building and loans (of course) were entirely invested in housing. This was more or less true across the nation. When prices plummeted in 1928, the valuation of total construction dropped by 75% (1925-1932).

Your other claims about Hoover doing little are easily refuted by the numbers (total government spending is what matters) and initial jawboning to maintain wages (classical economic critics slammed him for not letting wages and prices drop). You are correct on one thing: the drop in private construction offset this crude Keynesian approach. But that just goes to show that the “stimulus” approach of Hoover, et al. doesn’t work. Yet here we are doing the same thing all over. We learn nothing.

Postscript:  forget the Florida boom, it was a blip. What happened in the 1920s was very similar to what happened in the 2000s. Find me a textbook that draws that parallel or does anything but talk about the stock market, a free market run amok, etc. In short, there is a lot of exciting new literature by economists on the importance of residential housing cycle but historians are stuck in the old textbook script that you recount toward the end of your post.

Recommended reading: in addition to works by Leamer, see the following works. Note that nearly all of this work is by economists and relatively new (although some saw it in the 1930s and the business press chronicled the bubble/bust in the 1920s). Foldvary gets an "award" for predicting the crash with his "Austrian-Georgist" analysis but Gjerstad and Smith raised attention after the fact with their papers and articles in the Wall Street Journal (Smith was 2002 Nobel winner in economics). The award for worst timed prediction goes to Smith and Smith, "Bubble, Bubble, Where's the Housing Bubble?" (2005) which saw housing as still a good investment. For a cheeky look at that wrongheaded analysis, see this "flashback" blog.

Blaszczyk, Regina Lee. "No Place Like Home: Herbert Hoover and the American Standard of Living," in Uncommon Americans: The Lives and Legacies of Herbert and Lou Henry Hoover (2003)

Davis, Morris and Jonathan Heathcote. "Housing and the Business Cycle."

Foldvary, Fred. "Economic Forecast, 2004-2010": "My forecast is a severe depression at the end of the decade" based on his reading of the housing boom.

------.  "The Business Cycle: A Georgist-Austrian Synthesis." American Journal of  Economics and Sociology 56 (4)  (October 1997): 521-41.

------. The Depression of 2008.  Gutenberg Press, 2007. 36 pages.

Gaffney, Mason, "An Award for Calling the Crash," Econ Journal Watch (May 2011)

Gjerstad, Steve and Vernon L. Smith, "Household Expenditure Cycles and Economic Cycles, 1920-2010,"

_____. "From Bubble to Depression," Wall Street Journal (April 6 1929)

_____. "Why We're in for a Long, Hard Economic Slog," Wall Street Journal (September 10, 2010)

Philips, McManus, Nelson. Banking and the Business Cycle: A Study of the Great Depression in the United States (1937; reprinted 2011)

Simpson, Herbert. "Real Estate Speculation and the Depression," American Economic Review (1933): notes the urban/suburban nature of the latest bubble of the 1920s.

White, Eugene. "Lessons from the Great American Real Estate Boom and Bust of the 1920s" (NBER, September 2009)


Monday, August 22, 2011 - 10:02


Ralph Raico

 Since there are numerous mentions of the anniversary of the Berlin wall I thought I'd share my experiences. In 1961 I was an exchange student in Paris and decided to go to see the wall for myself. (Berlin in December was the coldest I have ever been.) Passing through Checkpoint Charlie I  entered Communist territory for the first time. It was as I'd expected: the universal hopeless shabbiness of the city and the people. I spoke with as many as I could. No one criticized the regime, of course. One old man said, gratefully, "Sie geben uns alles was wir brauchen." (They give us everything we need.) I maliciously asked another man where THEIR Kurfürstendamm, the Fifth Avenue of West Berlin, was. He replied, abashed, "Well, we don't have anything EXACTLY like that." I visited a few bookstores, noting the endless shelves of works by Marx, Lenin, and the then East German leader, Ulbricht. I was hoping that they might have Mises's Socialism, misled by the title, but they weren't fools—they knew their enemy. I had a crummy lunch at one of their elite restaurants, and decided to go back. Still on East German soil I encountered a soldier. Idiot that I was—I could have been detained for trying to subvert their military—I looked him in the face and said, "Komm mit."  (Come along.) He replied, "Kann nicht." (I can't.) I sauntered back past Checkpoint Charlie, feeling a burden lifting from my shoulders, and went home .


Sunday, August 21, 2011 - 18:35


Robert Higgs


Robert Higgs is Senior Fellow in Political Economy for The Independent Institute and Editor of the Institute’s quarterly journal The Independent Review. He received his Ph.D. in economics from Johns Hopkins University, and he has taught at the University of Washington, Lafayette College, Seattle University, and the University of Economics, Prague.

In the standard U.S. history course in high schools and universities, students are usually taught that until the Spanish-American War, the United States had followed for the most part the advice of Washington and Jefferson to steer clear of foreign entanglements.  Americans had devoted themselves overwhelmingly to building their civilization here at home, whereas from 1898 onward, they began to “look outward” and to embrace the “large policy” of national greatness and foreign empire favored by such leading figures as Henry Cabot Lodge, John Hay, and Theodore Roosevelt.  This way of dividing U.S. history into two epochs–before and after the onset of overseas imperialism–is fundamentally misleading.

Americans were empire builders from the get-go.  From the moment the British colonists set foot on the North American continent, they resolved to engage in what the historians rather romantically and unreflectively call “westward movement,” which some nineteenth-century Americans characterized as the realization of their “manifest destiny.”  This movement was itself an expression of imperialism, and some Americans, such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, were not ashamed to speak forthrightly of an American empire that would develop naturally as the (white) population grew and moved across the continent.

As my parenthetical qualification in the preceding sentence suggests, however, this vision disregarded one rather large fact:  the continent across which these white people longed to expand was already inhabited by native Americans whose forebears had settled it more or less thickly over the previous millennia.  The whites dealt with this difficulty by hook and by crook, doing whatever seemed expedient at the time–killing the Indians, driving them farther and farther to the west, buying their land, stealing their land, making treaties subsequently to be broken—to get the land they imagined to be theirs by divine design.

At the end of the American War of Independence, the Treaty of Paris established a western boundary for the new nation at the Mississippi River.  Little by little, the Americans added huge chunks to the U.S. territory by means of an unconstitutional purchase of French claims to Louisiana (Jefferson conveniently set aside his belief in strict construction of the Constitution), an offer that Spain dared not refuse (for Florida), a settlement of disputed claims with Great Britain (to get the Oregon Country), and wars of aggression against Mexico (to snatch the southwest).  By this continental imperialism, the United States pushed its western edge to the Pacific Ocean and its northern and southern boundaries deep in areas previously claimed by Mexico and Great Britain, as the map shows.

Imagine, however, that history had taken a different turn; in particular, that each of the major territories incorporated into the United States (not counting Alaska and Hawaii) had become instead an independent country.  Each of them, except perhaps Florida, would have been fairly large as nation-states go. Each would have contained a vast diversity of natural resources, fertile lands for agricultural development, and long coastlines from which they could have engaged in cheap, waterborne international commerce.  In short, each of these territories would have been completely viable as an independent country.

If history had taken this shape, how might the six nations of central North America have developed?  Would they have gone to war with one another, perhaps shifting or blotting out their original borders, or might their leaders have seen the advantage of embracing continental free trade and friendly relations, perhaps even unobstructed flows of labor along the lines of the modern European Union?  We can only conjecture answers to these questions.

One thing seems fairly sure, however:  no one of these nations would have been as likely to develop into the global hegemon that the United States of America is today.  And this outcome, one may well suppose, would have been a godsend for the people of other parts of the world because, however much today’s Americans enjoy whooping it up about being Number 1 and about “kicking ass” around the world with their far-flung military forces, those on the receiving end of this kicking do not appreciate it any more than the native Americans appreciated it back in the days when American imperialism was confined for the most part to North America.


Tuesday, August 16, 2011 - 20:56


Sheldon Richman

Media message to candidates: It's okay to oppose government spending and debt, but if you oppose war and empire, we'll marginalize the crap out of you.


Monday, August 15, 2011 - 11:27


Sheldon Richman

My latest TGIF laments that libertarians haven't emphasized social cooperation, a la Mises, instead of individualism and self-reliance.


Monday, August 15, 2011 - 11:31


Jonathan J. Bean

Jonathan Bean is Research Fellow at the Independent Institute, Professor of History at Southern Illinois University, and editor of the book, Race and Liberty in America: The Essential Reader.

[Crosspost from Beacon]

For the past year, I have been researching how the housing bubble of the 1920s contributed to the Great Depression.  My study involves reading many articles and speeches by Herbert Hoover, first as Commerce Secretary (1921-1928) then as president (1929-1933).  As the nation endures the Obama presidency, I see much in common between the two men, both seen as "smart" by their supporters.

We forget that Hoover had a "titanic intellect," a stellar career as a mining engineer, translated medieval manuscripts into English, and wrote the textbook Principles of Mining.  He helped orchestrate relief aid to save millions from hunger and starvation across post-World War I Europe.  During the 1920s, he was a "progressive" busybody telling businessmen in all fields how they could make their work more efficient.  His Commerce Department held 2,500 trade association meetings.  One of those associations—the American Construction Council—was headed by trade lobbyist Franklin Delano Roosevelt. 

No, I am not making this up!  FDR thought Hoover's "smart" approach to jawboning business was an improvement upon competitive capitalism.

Barack Obama can't boast that kind of record (he achieved very little before becoming president) but he shares the same cast of mind as Hoover:  In a recent Wall Street Journal article, "Is Obama Smart?," Bret Stephens concludes that

a) Obama (like Hoover) thinks he is smarter than those who run businesses; but

b) "stupid is as stupid does."

As their "smart" policies failed year after year, Hoover and Obama dug in and blamed the international environment ("economic headwinds").  Note to readers:  contrary to myth, historians now accept that Hoover was an extremely active president who increased spending by 50%, ran deficits and promoted what we would later call Keynesian policies:  cutting taxes (to stimulate purchasing power), encouraging public works (infrastructure) and bailing out banks (Reconstruction Finance Corporation).  He also revived antitrust after it lay dormant for a decade.  Sound familiar?  Here is a cartoon lampooning his "stimulus" approach (then called "priming the pump").

In both cases, many businessmen (and now businesswomen) were skeptical of candidates Hoover and Obama.  Obviously, there are differences, but note the similarity between the "know-it-all" attitude of these two men, particularly in areas where they knew very little.  The first excerpt is from "Wall Street Looks at Hoover" in Outlook magazine (1928), with a reporter interviewing a businessman-banker as to why so many businessmen opposed Hoover's candidacy in 1928.  The second excerpt is from the Wall Street Journal article above (collecting statements by and about Obama's "really smart" qualities).

Hoover 1928:

The Outlook reporter anonymously interviewed a prominent banker as to why business was opposed to Hoover, a "smart" candidate who mesmerized the the country with how he would engineer permanent prosperity.

Banker:  My firm "has many textile manufacturers as clients . . . but nobody in the bank would presume to tell our customers how to make rayon."  Yet Hoover is "confident that he knows more about finance than financiers, more about industry than industrialists, and more about agriculture than agriculturists.  He is so sure of his judgment in these fields that he wants to impress it on others.  He is very seldom willing to take advice.  Since he knows more than any advisers could, why should he?"

"[Hoover's] cast of mind will handicap him . . . . Because of his confidence in his own wisdom he is suspicious of those who disagree with him."

"We object, moreover, not only to his ignoring our advice.  We object to his offering us his advice on matters that are none of his business."  [Banker notes how Hoover's Commerce Department urged business to invest in certain industries or areas].  "It is not our function as bankers to tell our customers with whom they should do business."

Obama 2008:

"'I think I'm a better speech writer than my speech writers,'" [Obama] reportedly told an aide in 2008. ' I know more about policies on any particular issue than my policy directors. And I'll tell you right now that I'm . . . a better political director than my political director.'"

Stephens writes:  "How many times have we heard it said that Mr. Obama is the smartest president ever?  Even when he's criticized, his failures are usually chalked up to his supposed brilliance.  Liberals say he's too cerebral for the Beltway rough-and-tumble. . . ."

"Socrates taught that wisdom begins in the recognition of how little we know.  Mr. Obama is perpetually intent on telling us how much he knows.  Aristotle wrote that the type of intelligence most needed in politics is prudence, which in turn requires experience.  Mr. Obama came to office with no experience."

Much is made of the president's rhetorical gifts.  This is the sort of thing that can be credited only by people who think that a command of English syntax is a mark of great intellectual distinction.  Can anyone recall a memorable phrase from one of Mr. Obama's big speeches that didn't amount to cliché?"

We have now reached the point where many Americans, even those who voted for Obama, share the attitude of those disillusioned with Hoover:  In 1931, they recalled how they felt just three years prior:  Hoover seemed so wonderful! He promised to end poverty in our time! And he seemed so smart!  But now he beats us down (if we are in business) and his speeches feel robotic, much like the "Hall of Presidents" with the "Audio-Anatromic" figure of Abraham Lincoln motioning stiffly to the audience.

Perhaps, someday, that Hall of Presidents will have a new figure—President Obama's  teleprompter, now the butt of jokes and running commentary on the president's day-to-day failings.

We all know how well Hoover did in practice. It's starting to look like "deja vu all over again."

*****

Recommended Reading:

Joan Hoff Wilson, Herbert Hoover: The Forgotten Progressive (1975)

"The American Presidency Project": splendid site to compare the reactions of Hoover and Obama to stock market crashes, bailouts, the international environment and much more.


Friday, August 12, 2011 - 20:48


Roderick T. Long

 Have you noticed that whenever mention is made of secession, establishment types always say, “that issue was settled in 1865”?


Wednesday, August 10, 2011 - 09:58


Roderick T. Long

 

queue

In Britain, street gangs queue up to loot shops.

The linked article is wittily titled “Anarchy in the U.K.” Of course the most anarchistic thing the gangs did was the queuing, not the looting. All the same, there is an anarchistic moral to be drawn from the story: it’s an example of how social mores continue to produce social order in the absence of government police.


Tuesday, August 9, 2011 - 20:05


Roderick T. Long

 Lawrence O'Donnell


Saturday, August 6, 2011 - 23:38


Mark Brady

Gar Alperovitz explains why it was not necessary to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order to persuade Japan to cede defeat. Even General bombs-away-with-Curtis LeMay was dismayed. Shortly after the bombings he stated publicly: "The war would have been over in two weeks. . . . The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all."


Friday, August 5, 2011 - 15:41


Robert Higgs

The humor columnist for the New York Times, Paul Krugman, has recently taken to defending his vulgar Keynesianism against its critics by accusing them of making arguments that rely on the existence of a “confidence fairy.” By this mockery, Krugman seeks to dismiss the critics as unscientific blockheads, in contrast to his own supreme status as a Nobel Prize-winning economic scientist.

The irony in this dismissal, as others, including my friend Donald Boudreaux, have already pointed out, is that Krugman’s own vulgar Keynesianism relies on a much more ethereal explanatory force for its own account of macroeconomic fluctuations–namely, the so-called animal spirits. The master himself wrote in The General Theory: “Thus if the animal spirits are dimmed and the spontaneous optimism falters, leaving us to depend on nothing but a mathematical expectation, enterprise will fade and die.  . . . [I]ndividual initiative will only be adequate when reasonable calculation is supplemented and supported by animal spirits. . . .” (p. 162). Because Keynes conceived of his “animal spirits” as “a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction” (p. 161), he of course had no way to explain their coming and going or to measure or evaluate them in any way. They are as surreal as a ghost–when and why they come and go, no man knows or can know.  Such is the force that drives the ups and downs of private investment in Keynesian economic theory, and such theory unfailingly drives Krugman’s commentaries on the recession and on the possibility and effective means of recovery from it.

Regime uncertainty, however, has a much more grounded basis. In my own research on the topic, I have presented evidence derived from (1) a mass of testimony by investors, businessmen, and other contemporaries, (2) voluminous historical facts on the character of government actions that reasonable people had every reason to interpret as theatening the security of their private property rights, (3) variations in the structure of investment, especially as between short-term and longer-term projects, and (4) specific twists in the term-structure of returns on private corporate bonds, as well as other relevant evidence on the behavior of financial markets.

As against this varied and substantial evidence, what does the proponent of animal sprits have to offer? Well, nothing at all. The idea is purely fanciful, the product of Lord Keynes’s fertile imagination.

However, we would do well to note that in the section of his book where Keynes introduces the idea of animal spirits, he also discusses it in a way that makes its effects somewhat similar to those of regime uncertainty as described in my own writings.

This [operation of varying animal spirits] means, unfortunately, not only that slumps and depressions are exaggerated in degree, but that economic prosperity is excessively dependent on a political and social atmosphere which is congenial to the average business man. If the fear of a Labour Government or a New Deal depresses enterprise, this need not be the result either of a reasonable calculation or of a plot with political intent;–it is the mere consequence of upsetting the delicate balance of spontaneous optimism. In estimating the prospects of investment, we must have regard, therefore, to the nerves and hysteria and even the digestions and reactions to the weather of those upon whose spontaneous activity it largely depends.” (p. 162, emphasis added)

Although Keynes greatly underestimated the degree to which investors’ expectations about the security of their property rights rest on perfectly rational grounds for fearing what a Roosevelt administration or an Obama administration might do, he recognizes that, whatever the basis for variations in their flow of animal spirits, business confidence plays an essential part of driving private investment. Paul Krugman, please reread your master’s masterpiece.


Thursday, August 4, 2011 - 11:41


Mark Brady

Go here for the full story.  You can listen to the debate here.


Wednesday, August 3, 2011 - 03:02


Jonathan J. Bean

Get ready for life in ultra small cars, shorn of spare tires and other unnecessary weight. The Obama administration has set the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards to 54.5 mpg! There will be fines (read: added costs) if you choose the wrong kind of vehicle or buy from an auto company that fails to meet this standard by 2025.

One thing that most didn’t see coming with Obama: he has defined his jobs agenda as one focused on “green” jobs. He talks about nothing else. Most Americans would prefer any jobs, but green jobs are the “jobs of the future,” so saith the Wizardly Lecturer from Hyde Park, Chicago.

Already car makers are throwing out spare tires and substituting spray cans for when our tires break down. Spare tire = too much weight. What’s next? Head rests? Convenience must give way to reducing carbon footprints. Think of the planet! And all those “future jobs!”

The government reassures us: this is “for our own good” and will save us money. Apparently, we are not able to make the “right” decision on purchases from toilets (“low flush” is for our own good) to light bulbs (no incandescents) to cars. Besides, everyone was expecting 62.5 as the new standard. Do mopeds get that much? FACT CHECK: Yes, they get 80-100 mpg but a family of four would need four mopeds. Perhaps a family-mo-ped of connected motorized bicycles?

A move to natural gas cars makes sense given the vast new reserves in America but . . . the EPA just handed down a  requirement that pollution from natural gas drilling must be cut by 25% (consider: natural gas is far cleaner than coal or oil but you can always require “better” standards somewhere down the line!).

Le mieux est l’ennemi du bien (“the better is the enemy of the good” – Voltaire).

Enter the Germans: Daimler-Benz is adamantly opposed to the extreme CAFE standards proposed for 2025 (they ramp up between now and then with much higher penalties).

“Mercedes-Benz, the luxury car line owned by German auto and truck maker Daimler, did not back the new system, saying it “clearly favors large SUVs and pickup trucks.”

Why the fear of a switch to trucks and SUVs? Because the standard for trucks and SUVs is much lower. One wonders what the EPA is thinking, although (sadly), I think I know.

The Germans are right to complain that this is protectionism by the back door and it is also profoundly distracting from the need to create a business climate that allows job to arise wherever investors and businesses can create them. It is not the president’s job to pick which jobs ought to be created. It is a quixotic quest, literally, focused on windmills and other perceived “Giants” of industry yet to come. Green jobs are not going to move a $15 trillion economy into recovery.

Meanwhile, Government Motors (GM) is quite pleased because they have been betting on their electric car. If the government can crush the competition, then people will have to buy cars they don’t want. And isn’t that the left-liberal dream?

The Greens are happy with job-destroying CAFE standards and the elimination of all possible energy sources (via new EPA regulations), except perhaps solar panels on top of your car. Reason columnist rightly calls the EPA’s anti-business jihad the “regulatory equivalent of declaring war on carmakers.” On the other hand, why should they be left out when the president has expressed no incentives toward any other industry?

It’s going to be a long recession when nearly every job generating activity, “green” aside, is being bopped by the EPA and its sister agencies (Obama’s outgoing antitrust head applauded herself for reviving antitrust attacks and directing them at new targets, including venture capitalists and tech companies).Of course, every action has a reaction and we must learn to live in the world of Obama’s imagination because it is now, by regulatory order, the “law” of the land (so much for separation of powers and Congress-passes-a-law).

On a positive note, beer has a low carbon footprint and that ought to please German brewers if our government wasn’t devaluing the dollar to keep out products like . . . German beer!

Personal reactions and thoughts:

*If readers have tips on shrinking my 6’2″ frame into a solar-powered go-kart, please email me.

*Could GM purchase bicycle maker Schwinn and get bicyles included under the “car” category for CAFE purposes? After all, my state’s lieutenant governor ran (biked) most of her political career on an agenda of—I kid you not–riding a bike to work.

*BEER! Those muckrakers who test such things say it is an extremely green industry (zero carbon footprint). Let’s have more beer, less driving.  Drink, Don’t Drive!

Postscript: please do our German friends a favor: since we can no longer afford their cars, buy a German brew from time to time. Drink locally, buy beer globally.

**********

Recommended reading:

Close and Higgs, ed. Re-Thinking Green: Alternatives to Environmental Bureaucracy (2005)

Meiners and Stroup, Cutting Green Tape: Toxic Pollutants, Environmental Regulation and the Law (2000)


Wednesday, August 3, 2011 - 10:47


Roderick T. Long

“Anarchism is a political philosophy which considers the state undesirable, unnecessary, and harmful, and instead promotes a stateless society, or anarchy. Any information relating to anarchists should be reported to your local police.”London Metropolitan Police (plagiarising Wikipedia for the first sentence)


Tuesday, August 2, 2011 - 11:25