To the Editor: Ian Ayres implies that professors ordering textbooks they have written is unethical and engenders a conflict of interest (“Just What the Professor Ordered,” Op-Ed, September 16, 2005). Prof. Ayres says that by giving students who buy his book a rebate, “we will all know that I assigned the book for the right reason.” One wonders, then, why he authored a textbook in the first place. Presumably he thought he could contribute something to his students’ education by producing a textbook which was superior to others. But if this is his view, then it would be irresponsible for him not to order it. A professor’s responsibility is not to order the cheapest books available, it is to order what he or she judges to be the best ones for a given class, and that would naturally include the ones he or she has written.[end of letter - in signing, I noted both that I am a professor and that I have co-edited a textbook]

They ran someone else’s letter today which makes a similar point, but unfortunately sandwiched among several others supporting Ayres. Two other points I’d make which I was obliged to leave out of the letter for space considerations: 1, Ayres implies that he’s entitled to his profits if anyone else orders his book, so it’s not clear why he shouldn’t be entitled to them. He’s free to turn them down, of course, but his implication is that it’s wrong to profit from his own work, which is absurd. The second letter down today deals with this nicely, IMO. 2, Ayres argues that it would be a good thing if administrations had more control over a professor’s course content and text selection. Um, no.

UPDATE: Eugene Volokh weighs in; agrees with me; says it better.

UPDATE ad absurdum: Sorry Plato, you can't use Republic at the Academy - conflict of interest.

Ferling's ... imagination sometimes brings forth predictable turns of phrase, such as that both John Adams and Thomas Jefferson were"smoldering" for an absent woman (Adams for his wife, Jefferson for Mrs. Cosway), and occasionally leads him to reconstruct plausible but undocumented scenes to make his narrative more vivid. But his imagination, combined with his intelligence and learning, also helps him offer clear and credible explanations for complicated motives and moves, such as Hamilton's public attack on Adams's character in the middle of the campaign of 1800, or the House of Representatives balloting that eventually selected Jefferson over Burr for president.
Dunn's book, like Ferling's, includes some thoughtful passages on several important topics: for example, the development of the first party system into the second; the need for effective presidents to be partisan; and Jefferson's appointments strategy... Dunn ...recognizes the significance of the unprecedented practice of one party peacefully handing over power to another after a deep and bitter electoral clash—though she ruins this insight (which she seems to have picked up from Seymour Martin Lipset) by adding that a good two-party system"would take away any moral right to revolution."
Neither Ferling nor Dunn considers whether the more traditional nonpartisan views of George Washington and John Adams had any merit. Dunn makes some perceptive remarks about Washington's Farewell Address, but inaccurately interprets it as"an attack on parties in general." In fact Washington's premise (similar to Madison's in The Federalist) is that in republics, where all offices are elective, there will never be too little partisanship...

First is the tendency to forget that the sometimes disunited, desperate, repressive, paranoid, anti-philosophical and offensively elitist Federalist Party of the late 1790s (and later) was not like the Federalist Party of the early 1790s. The Federalist Party changed much more during the 1790s than the Republican Party did, and it did not improve. In the beginning, when they had just won the battle to ratify the Constitution, and before they were challenged by the Republican Party, Federalists were confident and united. Many scholars tend to paint the Federalists unfairly as very dark from the outset, because they painted themselves pretty dark during their later struggles and death throes. Thus Ferling praises Jefferson for having been"among the first to divine the reactionary threat posed by the extreme conservatives in the early days of the new Republic."
This first affliction is often identical with the apparently strong compulsion, which both Ferling and Dunn have, to push the 1790s—if not all of American history—into a crude Progressive mold, and to interpret the conflicts between Federalists and Republicans as part of the great democratic struggle of the masses against deference to wealth and pomp. Of course, some Republicans did sometimes talk as if that were the central issue, and some Federalists did sometimes give them reason to talk that way, but in fact the partisan divisions were not nearly as simple-minded as that. Even if the parties had displayed such a neat class correlation, their policy differences were far more interesting and captivating, and even with no socio-economic conflict at all these differences would still have pushed politics towards electoral competition and realignment.
Both Ferling and Dunn undermine their argument that the party conflict of the 1790s should be understood as part of the battle against deference, when they draw our attention to the Republicans' very effective tactic of nominating party slates of"illustrious Revolutionary heroes" or other"dazzling" public figures as candidates for the electoral college or for state legislators who would then be choosing those electors. The success of this tactic, which brought Jefferson and Burr nearly all of Pennsylvania's electoral votes in 1796, as well as every electoral vote in the crucial state of New York in 1800, suggests that a kind of deference was not entirely absent from the new politics. (Of course, this tactic was complemented by an energetic ground war to get out likely Republican voters, and that was new.)
Dunn ...suggests (a little contradictorily?) that although class conflict drove the discord between Republicans and Federalists, class solidarity between these winning and losing parties explains why that discord did not become very violent... She can't help it if Jefferson and Madison and the others don't quite see it that way. That just shows their limits. They were"fathers," after all, which is pretty well equivalent to"elitists." Anyway, Dunn reminds us, since then we Americans have cleverly managed to combine Hamiltonian means (an interventionist federal government) with Jeffersonian ends (empowerment of individuals to pursue happiness), so all's better in today's party system. And we can be proud that we got where we are in spite our founding fathers.
The second widespread affliction affecting scholarship on the 1790s is the tendency to pass over too quickly the seriousness of the decision made by the leaders of what became the Republican Party to create that party in the first place. In the 1790s the Founders advanced towards the realization that in liberal democracies, a certain kind of principled partisanship deserves a degree of public respectability. However, most historians and political scientists do not see that this realization was largely achieved already in 1792 (insofar as the Founders did achieve it: some of this work was left to the"second party system"). They do not see that foreign wars and their domestic repercussions from 1793 to 1800 temporarily distorted that achievement and delayed its electoral results for eight years. If only Jefferson had spoken of the"Revolution of 1792"! Ferling accepts the conventional claim that it took American reaction to the French Revolution and other foreign policy events to make most Americans focus on the partisan contest, and although he discusses some of the interesting manoeuvres and publications preceding the election of 1792, he does not accept the Republican leaders' own acknowledgement that they were building a (temporary) political party. Dunn does not discuss the election of 1792, and she moves even more swiftly than Ferling to the foreign policy-related issues and elections of the later 1790s.
In December 1792, after most of the congressional election results were in, Jefferson—anticipating the language of his First Inaugural Address—predicted that the government"will, from the commencement of the next session of Congress, retire and subside into the true principles of the Constitution," supported by those who felt themselves to be"republicans and federalists too." After 1792, Jefferson came to realize that the Republicans had to win control of the presidency as well as Congress in a partisan campaign (they had already had a go at taking the vice-presidency away from Adams in 1792). However, he and other Republicans made it clear in all of the elections of that decade that their fundamental disagreement with Federalists was over Alexander Hamilton's economic project, which the two parties had fought over—Republicans had thought once and for all—in the election of 1792.
Republicans were already confidently and energetically appealing to American public opinion—through a peaceful electoral campaign—to establish the majority's voice in the government, in order to oppose imprudent measures that had been undertaken by that government only because it had not sufficiently consulted the public. Instead of basing its novel policies on any kind of public consultation, the federal government had been running in an unrepublican manner: as in Britain, executive ministers initiated policies, which it seemed they got enacted by improperly influencing the proceedings of the legislative branch.
Thus, much of the outlook and strategy of the Revolution of 1800 appeared in the Revolution of 1792, which set the precedent for principled public partisanship. But what took Republicans so long to establish their electoral and policy revolution? From later American history, we can now see that this delay was not abnormal; in the realigning elections of the 1790s, just as in the 1820s, 1850s, 1890s, and 1930s (and 1990s?), the House reflected the emerging partisan realignment before the White House did. Nevertheless, two special factors explain the delay of realignment in the 1790s. In addition to the fact that George Washington (whom Jefferson diligently tried but failed to get on their side) remained president until 1797, the Republicans' main impediment was the distraction of foreign policy issues. As soon as good prospects of peace with both Britain and France appeared, the Republican Party received a peace dividend. Some Federalists saw this coming, and feared that the Republicans' policy and patronage revolutions would be even more sharply to their disadvantage than they turned out to be. This fear incited their frantic efforts to come to an"understanding" with Jefferson (that he would not fire them and reverse their key policies) before finally letting him emerge ahead of Aaron Burr in the tie-breaking balloting by the House of Representatives in 1801.
What's missing from these two books, and from scholarship on the 1790s more generally, is a good understanding of the actions and intentions of America's first partisans when they were first being partisan, in 1792. We need that understanding in order to judge to what extent those actions deserve praise or blame, and in what manner they deserve imitation or avoidance.

Nonsense. The Pledge of Allegiance was written in 1892 by socialist Francis Bellamy.

Like many American socialists of the era, Bellamy subscribed to John Dewey’s notion that government should exercise monopoly control over education in order to produce citizens with sound “progressive” ideals. It’s no coincidence that the pledge was written for an event (sponsored by the National Education Association!) called the National Public Schools Celebration. The goal was to instill mindless loyalty to the national government so that it could more readily socialize American society – a goal that America’s founding generation would have found deeply abhorrent.

The city of Brasilia, population 500,000, has never been known as a welcoming place. Reason, not human warmth, is the organizing principle here. The metropolis was born in the late 1950s, when Brazil's president, Juscelino Kubitschek, decided, with a conviction bordering on megalomania, that coastal Rio de Janeiro, with its choked, skinny streets and decaying vine-covered buildings, was unfit to be a capital. His impoverished nation needed to modernize."Fifty years' progress in five," the right-leaning nationalist proclaimed, before enlisting thousands of peasants to transform Brazil's most uncharted, unpeopled hinterland into a grand city inside of five years....

Kubitschek saw Brasilia as the beacon of a modernist world, and he hired a devoutly modern urban planner to make his vision a reality. Lucio Costa, a Brazilian, was a disciple of Le Corbusier, the influential mid-20th-century French architect/professor who eschewed all ornamentation as"bourgeois" and envisioned a high-tech egalitarian future in which all buildings were beautiful in their sleek simplicity. Corbusier famously decreed that houses should be"machines for living in." Costa, in turn, called for an"efficient" capital city in which the TV tower would be a monument, a downtown attraction occupying the same space, geographically and spiritually, that the Washington Monument does in D.C. The street grid in Brasilia would be shaped like an airplane, with two"wings" of avenues and a long thin spine -- the grassy Monumental Axis, lined with government buildings -- forming the core. The automobile, meanwhile, would spirit through the metropolis on its own uncluttered highways, and the open spaces would be protected in perpetuity, so that daily life could unfold in bucolic, pedestrian-friendly environs.

Brasilia did not turn out as planned. What I found was a city defined by its silences. Its core is a wealthy enclave in which building new structures is essentially outlawed. Few children play in the community parks -- they're too pristine -- and residents tend not to shop in their neighborhoods. In this spread-out car city, the shopping mall reigns supreme. A spirit of anomie enveloped the streets around me, and the suicide, divorce and pedestrain-fatality rates in Brasilia are longstanding sources of concern. Visiting there in the 1980s, Australian art critic Robert Hughes called the place"a museum of architectural ideas" and a"utopian horror."

Many people have asked if the conference on"The Murder of Emmett Till and the Struggle for Civil Rights," is still being held despite Katrina. Yes it is. Details are below:

The Murder of Emmett Till and the Struggle for Civil Rights, Stillman College, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, September 15-17, 2005.

The murder of Emmett Till and the trial of his accused killers were turning points in the history of the civil rights movement. These events have fascinated historians as well as filmmakers, journalists, literary critics, song writers, and novelists. Most recently, the federal government has reopened the case. This

conference will be held at Stillman College, a historical black college founded in 1876. It will mark the fiftieth anniversary of the murder, investigation, and trial, as well as explore the broader effects on American society. The last day of the conference will feature an optional guided tour of key sites in Mississippi including Money (where Till was kidnapped), Sumner (where the accused killers were tried), and Mound Bayou (where Till's mother and the black media stayed during the trial).

Speakers include Wheeler Parker, a cousin of Emmett Till who was present when he was kidnapped, John Herbers a journalist who covered the trial, Charles Payne, author of I've Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle; Christopher Benson, co-author (with Mamie Till-Mobley) of The Death of Innocence: The Hate Crime that Changed America; and Christopher Metress, author of The Lynching of Emmett Till.Papers and panels will discuss the murder, trial, and investigation as well as their impact on the civil rights movement, literature, film, journalism, and criminal justice.

For a complete schedule and registration information, see

http://www.stillman.edu/stillman/whatscurrent/Emmett%20Till/emmetttillreg.asp

For a conference brochure, see

http://www.stillman.edu/stillman/news/publicrelations/emmit%20till%20conf.%20rsvd.july19.pdf

or contact Linda Royster Beito, Chair, Social Sciences, Stillman College, Tuscaloosa, AL 35401, lbeito@stillman.edu, Phone: 205-366-8984.

I think I've written all the replies I intend to write at this point. Much of our disagreement is a matter of interpretation, as with Reconstruction; this is certainly Clyde Wilson's view of Hummel's arguments. Moreover, the" constitutional fetishism" stuff, while I understand the Spoonerite position, is just inside baseball talk that I don't think most people would consider exactly a home run against me. (Gene Healy, for example, who seems like a Spoonerite to me, argues that" constitutional consent" is, although a very distant second-best to the kind of unanimous consent Spooner thinks necessary, nevertheless at least something.) He's right that the book could be more radical, which is why I thought it was so funny that the Left reacted as it did -- this book is _tame_, I thought.

On the Indian land question, Hummel is just being unreasonable. Jennifer Roback, Anderson & Hill, and other libertarians take exactly the position I do -- that in the early years land transactions were by and large fair, and that the outrages came later. (See Anderson and Hill, The Not So Wild Wild West: Property Rights on the Frontier, Stanford, 2005.)