David T. Beito
Ken Burns and others are urging Congress to overturn the 1913 conviction of boxer Jack Johnson under the Mann Act.
The Mann Act deserves more than a passing mention on this site. Enacted in 1910 during the"white slavery" hysteria, it made it a federal crime to transport women across state lines for"immoral purposes."
The Mann Act played a critically important role in turning the FBI (before then a sleepy bureau in the DOJ) into a widely extended federal police agency. Mann Act investigations were the single largest item in the Bureau's budget before World War I and provided a precedent for using the Interstate Commerce Clause to apply to numerous other crimes.
In great part, the Feds singled out Johnson, who was known to consort openly with, and even marry, white women, as an example of what might befall a black man who too blantly crossed the sexual color line.
Aeon J. Skoble
Aeon J. Skoble
I can’t resist noting that I explored some of these themes here, but Jack’s essay is certainly more comprehensive.
Chris Matthew Sciabarra
I find it interesting that no matter what information comes out with regard to the status of WMDs in Iraq, people on both sides of the divide of this war use that information to bolster their already established positions. I know of maybe one or two people in toto who have changed their positions on the Iraq war; one went from pro to con, the other went from con to pro. That's two people in God-knows-how-many commentators I've read on this war. No doubt there are much deeper concerns that motivate many in this dialogue. I have voiced my own concerns umpteen times. I don't think people's different positions necessarily reveal any inherent intellectual dishonesty; but it does speak to the tenacity of viewpoints on this subject.
And so, it is no surprise that when I picked up the paper yesterday and read that a CIA report agrees in essence with earlier reports from David Kay and the US Senate that there were no WMDs in Iraq, few commentators had changed their positions. The nuclear program was in disarray, post-1991, even if Hussein still had nuclear ambitions. All chemical weapons stockpiles were destroyed in 1991, and no chemical weapons production had been resumed in the years since. The regime may have had the wherewithal to restart a biological weapons program, but its existing stockpiles of such weapons were destroyed in 1991-92.
The Hussein regime was being contained. Sure, there were loopholes in the containment policy: we know all about the cash nexus of the UN"Oil for Food" program; it is quite possible that those who opposed US military action in Iraq would have lobbied for the removal of sanctions, thus freeing Hussein to develop weapons. But in the post-9/11 world, this was not likely to happen. In my view, containment was working, and whatever Hussein's intentions, an increased post-9/11 US military presence in the Persian Gulf, and in Afghanistan, provided an adequate countervailing force.
Yes, Hussein sponsored terrorists (so have US"allies" like the Saudis, but the US never invaded or occupied Saudi Arabia). In any event, how many times do we have to hear that there was no operational relationship between the Hussein regime and Al Qaeda?
The Bush administration is unpersuaded. Big surprise there. And the critics of the administration have only used the most recent report to bolster their case (as I have done).
So what of the people whose positions have shifted, over time? One recent discussion of such an intellectual evolution focuses on Christopher Hitchens, who went from leftist to neocon fan. But that shift long predated the Iraq war. It's interesting, of course, in itself, because the Hitchens switcheroo speaks volumes about the nature of neoconservatism.
Within a year after the 9/11 attacks, Johann Hari explains,"Hitchens was damning his former comrades as 'soft on Islamic fascism', [there's that irritating phrase again!] giving speeches at the Bush White House, and describing himself publicly as 'a recovering ex-Trotskyite.' What happened?"
Well, for one, this"recovering ex-Trotskyite" aims his disgust at the"theocratic fascists" of the Arab world who are among"the most reactionary elements on earth. They stand for liquidating everything the left has fought for: women's rights, democracy?" Even though he's fast and loose with that word"fascism," which he equates simply with"submission and servility," he recognizes that the worst elements in the Arab-Islamic world wish to recreate the Caliphate through a"Grand Muslim Super State," as Juan Cole puts it.
Hitchens now fully opposes the antiwar left and he is equally opposed to"the Barry Goldwater-Pat Buchanan isolationist right." For Hitchens,"neoconservatism is a distinctively new strain of thought, preached by ex-leftists, who believed in using US power to spread democracy." Neoconservatives"were saying - we can't carry on with the approach to the Middle East we have had for the past fifty years. We cannot go on with this proxy rule racket, where we back tyranny in the region for the sake of stability. So we have to take the risk of uncorking it and hoping the more progressive side wins." In other words, Hitchens"has replaced a belief in Marxist revolution with a belief in spreading the American revolution. Thomas Jefferson has displaced Karl Marx."
In this sense, of course, Hitchens is perhaps among the purest of neocons, because he encapsulates the deeply constructivist impulse that unites neoconservative and socialist. Many of the neocons were former leftists and social democrats who shifted rightward; as former leftists, they embraced central planning on behalf of Marxist ideals. As new rightists, they embrace the same kind of planning, applied to global phenomena, on behalf of"liberal" ideals. In the former instance, there are enough Misesian and Hayekian reasons to reject the means and the ends. In the latter instance, Iibertarians might accept the ends... but most of us still reject the means. I'm afraid that, in both instances, the issue of"means" is what concerns me, because serious questions about how to create social change are being swept under the rug. As I have argued over and over again, the neocons, as leftist progeny, are sweeping under the rug the pernicious influence of tribal, religious, and ethnic conflict in indigenous cultures. There was always a tension in left-wing thought between analysis and prescription. Many leftists have offered crucially important analyses of historically specific circumstances. But they prescribe the same old constructivist rationalist solutions: that of imposing constructed designs on such circumstances as if from a position of omniscience. They stand like Archimedes outside the circumstances they seek to alter. Economically, their impositions created calculational chaos. But in a new age of leftist-turned-neocon, there is no limit to the global chaos that such state-guided planning will engender, especially when it is imposed on alien cultures that have never shown any appreciation for the liberal ideals being prescribed.
Interestingly, there is little substantive difference between the means of this imposition and those means preached by traditional fascists. Of course, there is a distinction between those who would destroy individual rights and those who seek to institute the rule of law. But neither regime can be"imposed" without supporting cultural preconditions. Even the Nazis understood this; it's the kind of cultural sociology that informs such studies as Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust, by Daniel Jonah Goldhagen. I have a lot more to say about the nature of fascism in the next post.
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Chris Matthew Sciabarra
In light of my recent post on Islamofascism, which has generated some good comments, I thought it important enough to discuss this topic in much greater detail.
Ironically, I've just discovered this morning an Adrian Lyttleton essay appearing in the October 21 issue of the NY Review of Books. Lyttleton's review of Robert O. Paxton's new book, The Anatomy of Fascism, asks the question"What Was Fascism?"
For years, the left asserted that fascism was simply capitalism with the gloves off. It was Leon Trotsky who first argued that fascism was a degenerative form of capitalism. Likewise, Nicos Poulantzas claimed that it was an authoritarian response to the contradictions of capitalism, when democratic institutions are no longer capable of patching up the"broken barrel" that is the free market.
But the free market, as such, has never existed in countries that fully embraced the fascist model of political economy. In Nazi Germany, for example, there was a Bismarkian history of heavy state involvement in the market. Far behind in the capitalist competitive"race," Bismark attempted to usher in modernity with policies of subsidization and tariff protectionism that benefited quasi-feudal landowners and industrialists. These trends continued through the first world war and led to glaring dislocations in the structure of production. In the post-World War I era, following an almost classic Hayekian"road to serfdom," the Weimar Republic responded to escalating chaos by embracing more stringent tariff and tax policies, public works, and rigid restrictions on foreign exchange. The"free market" was never the means by which German industry attempted to recoup. Instead, German industrialists embraced the statist policies of the Nazis, who merely cashed-in on the long Prussian tradition of political interventionism.
The suppression of a competitive price structure was achieved by the Nazis through laws that blocked market entry, setting up cartel arrangements based on compulsory prices that thwarted deflationary tendencies and froze the status quo of the corporate elite. (The Nazis, of course, also used the state to freeze out Jewish businessmen and landowners, who were simultaneously blamed for the decadence of both capitalism and Bolshevism.) Economic control became a technique of mass domination as a quasi-dictatorship of industrialists laid bare the class bias of fascist" corporatism." This" compulsory order" guaranteed profits, socialized losses and enriched capital-intensive industry.
Such production controls veil and dissemble economic facts, and the capital structure is mangled in the process. Moreover, state control over banks enabled the Nazis to embark on a huge military build-up, which funneled monetary expansion into a growing military-industrial complex. An autarkic philosophy of economics, as Franz Neumann called it, led to the collapse of German purchasing power, the crowding out of capital investment for consumer goods production and a dwindling domestic market for the very bourgeoisie that gave Hitler his mass support. Workers' wages plummeted, labor unions were crushed, and German business became a parasitic class. A similar process ensued in Mussolini's Italy.
Lyttleton emphasizes correctly, in the Paxton book review,"[t]hat fascists believed in the primacy of politics and had only an instrumental interest in economics."
Hitler put it succinctly: economics was there to serve the Volk, not the other way around. Fascist regimes were not afraid to use political methods and propaganda to achieve economic results. They announced clear targets and made their successes highly visible through intensive propaganda, framed in the language of struggle. ... [A]t a time when orthodox laissez-faire economics seemed to have no solutions to offer, the activism of the fascist regimes had great appeal. It is understandable that a number of the architects of the New Deal were impressed.
Of course, laissez-faire economics had both a solution and an explanation: it was government intervention that engendered the boom-bust cycle, and it was only government intervention that could make that cycle worse. But Lyttleton is absolutely correct to claim that “it was just this emphasis” on the politico-economic aims of fascism that
makes it possible to speak of a distinctive fascist political economy, which can best be summarized as the creation of a wartime economy in peacetime. Many of fascism’s institutions were direct recreations of the ad hoc structures created to manage the economy during World War I, such as the committees or consortia run by businessmen, but sanctioned by the state, which allocated raw materials and foreign exchange. This was the reality behind the pompous facade of Mussolini’s corporate state. The “consortialist state” would be a more accurate name for it. The ideal of autarky or economic self-sufficiency was distinctly fascist, and plainly linked to the creation of a war economy. But it was also a logical choice for fascist ideology.
These very same dynamics, it should be noted, were at work in the American political context. Murray Rothbard and others have written well of “War Collectivism in World War I” (see the essay by that name in the Radosh-Rothbard collection, A New History of Leviathan). I’ve written about these dynamics in an early article on the railroads during the first world war, but these same patterns were repeated in virtually every major industry in the United States. It is utterly fitting that the Wilsonian crusade to"make the world safe for democracy" entailed, necessarily, interventionism abroad and interventionism at home. That reality is no different today, when neoconservatives embrace the same Wilsonian mission in the hopes of transforming the Middle East. It is in the march toward war that the organic unity of the warfare state and the welfare state is built, with each aspect mutually reinforcing the other. And it is in this constituted nexus, as Lyttleton suggests, that fascism overturns the essence of economic freedom:
Fascist “anti-capitalism” was not just pseudo-revolutionary rhetoric, or a nostalgic vision of a pre-industrial craft and rural economy. Fascism expressed a consistent preference for “national production” over international finance, and for an organized and politically mobilized economy over the free market. ... In the developed fascist economy, industrialists lost much of their freedom to make decisions, although ... they were not too unhappy about this, since they kept their profits and were assured of a docile labor force whose wages stayed low. Only the small businessmen who had been conspicuous among fascism’s early supporters were radically disappointed. The hierarchical organization of cartels and producers’ associations under state supervision tended to favor larger firms.
This disappointment of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois was interesting, sociologically. Barrington Moore once asked about the Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, the title of his famous book. And John Weiss in his book, The Fascist Tradition, agreed fundamentally with Moore, that classical fascism was fueled by the peculiarly twentieth-century mass response of middle-class conservative groups"threatened by rapid liberalization of the social system in which they enjoyed a privileged place." Paradoxically, these middle-class groups provided the mass support necessary for the creation of fascist states, while ceding much control to the industrialists who benefited most from fascist political economy. Moore argued further that fascism has not developed in its classical form in traditionally democratic societies because these societies were able to affect a more complete break with the feudal past and its social order of static mediocrity.
Lyttleton's review discusses some of these issues as well. Fascist movements were very much shaped by the countries in which they emerged. Different manifestations were often a by-product of a different mix of leader, party, bureaucracy, traditional institutions, and cultural heritage. In almost all cases, however, fascists"acknowledged no theoretical limits to the invasion of private life." (Lyttleton warns that, actually,"[t]he increasing intrusion of fascism into private life threatened to undermine the consensus in favor of fascism among the middle classes.") This private-public fusion is, perhaps, one reason why some commentators talk in terms of"Islamofascism," which seeks an equally comprehensive public absorption of private life. As I write here, with regard to one of fundamentalist Islam's founding fathers, Sayyid Qutb:
Pining for a theocratic Islamic caliphate, Qutb's influential"theological criticism of modern life" lamented the dualistic"schizophrenia" of the secular and the sacred, science and religion. But as is typical with religious monists, Qutb sought to collapse secular life into religion. His"deepest quarrel was not with America's failure to uphold its principles," [Paul] Berman explains."His quarrel was with the principles. He opposed the United States because it was a liberal society" (emphasis added). The most"dangerous element" of that society was, in Qutb's view, the"separation of church and state." His version of liberation entailed an adherence to strict Islamic law ("Shariah") in defense of"freedom of conscience." But such liberation"meant freedom from false doctrines that failed to recognize God, freedom from the modern schizophrenia." It is no great leap to realize the dictatorial implications of this utopian vision, whose enforcement would echo the totalitarian projects of fascism, Nazism, and communism.
But, clearly, whatever totalitarian echoes one sees in the Qutbian vision, there are distinctions that disqualify the usage of the word"Islamofascism" to describe it, or to describe Islamic fundamentalism in general. This takes a bit more explanation, and Lyttleton's article helps.
As Lyttleton observes,"fascism was something else, something new and disquieting in its ability to mobilize positive enthusiasm and dedication, a form of modern mass politics." One of the keys to understanding fascism is its identification as"national socialism," or"national syndicalism," or more precisely,"nationalist socialism." And therein lies some of the parallels, not with theocratic Islamic fundamentalist dictatorships, but with quasi-fascist military dictatorships in the Arab world. There is a key difference between these military dictatorships and the regimes that neocons criticize typically as “Islamofascist.” The military dictatorships in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq took power in comparatively “secular” Arab countries. The whole Pan-Arab nationalist-socialist movement was opposed to the fundamentalists; in fact, as a member of the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood, Qutb himself was executed in 1966, under the Egyptian dictatorship of Gamal Abdel Nasser.
As Lyttleton points out, “[a] degree of secularization would ... seem to be a prerequisite for the emergence of fascist movements, which may appeal to religious values but use them in the service of nationalist or racist political goals.” Lyttleton continues:
In the Middle East, perhaps because Italy and Germany were seen as natural and influential allies against Britain and France, the dominant imperial powers, sympathy with historic fascism seems to have been particularly widespread. Nor can one put this down exclusively to the influence of anti-Semitism on Arab Muslims; one can find an interest in the fascist model among both the Christian Lebanese Phalange and the Israeli extreme right. [Lyttleton cites Heller’s essay, “The Failure of Fascism in Jewish Palestine, 1925-1948" from Larsen’s book, Fascism Outside Europe.] ... A more sinister long-term significance can be found in the ideological affiliations of the Baath Party of Syria and Iraq. Its founding father, Michel Aflaq, echoed fascist denunciations of “materialism” and soulless democracy. ... The two-front battle which the Baath fought against communism and movements based on the Shia majority is somewhat reminiscent of the situation in which the historic fascist movements found themselves. The Baath party-state was made possible by the secular nature of Iraqi society and by the growth of an urban middle class, financed by oil revenues. There seem to be few reasons not to call Saddam Hussein’s regime, “fascist.”
As Fitzgerald once pointed out (in a John Waterbury edited collection, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes), in Latin America, as in Egypt, quasi-fascism was enhanced through the creation of industrial oligopolies that depended"upon privileges and concessions obtained by access to government so that a 'proprietary' rather than 'entrepreneurial' business ethos obtains based on control over a limited market and exclusive licenses instead of mass sales and price competition."
But all of these developments in the Middle East were a quite distinct phenomenon from “Islamofascism.” Additionally, these developments demonstrate the fact that the Muslim-Arab world is not a monolith, but a cauldron of shifting tribes. And none of the tribes—be they Pan-Arabist or fundamentalist, be they led by military dictators, monarchs, or warlords—will accept the Western imposition of the"rule of law" (which law? Shariah?) without the cultural, philosophical, or socio-psychological preconditions upon which such a Western conception can be built and nourished.
In many ways, this situation embodies what Ayn Rand once said about World War II Europe, which was consumed by the struggles of competing forms of collectivism and statism. As the evil character Ellsworth Toohey states in The Fountainhead:
Watch the pincer movement. If you're sick of one version, we push you into the other. We get you coming and going. We've closed the doors. We've fixed the coin. Heads—collectivism, and tails—collectivism. Fight the doctrine which slaughters the individual with a doctrine which slaughters the individual. Give up your soul to a council—or give it up to a leader. But give it up, give it up, give it up. ... Offer poison as food and poison as antidote. Go fancy on the trimmings, but hang on to the main objective. Give the fools a choice, let them have their fun—but don't forget the only purpose you have to accomplish. Kill the individual. Kill man's soul. The rest will follow automatically.
There is an underlying socio-psychological dynamic at work in the universe of collectivist statism. Collectivism of any sort has a deadening effect on the individual's freedom to order his own conduct, and on the sense of self-responsibility that such freedom entails. Hayek warned of this effect back in the 1940s, when he examined the"socialist roots" of Nazism and fascism:
Responsibility, not to a superior, but to one's conscience, the awareness of a duty not exacted by compulsion, the necessity to decide which of the things one values are to be sacrificed to others, and to bear the consequences of one's own decision, are the very essence of any morals which deserve the name. That in this sphere of individual conduct the effect of collectivism has been almost entirely destructive is both inevitable and undeniable. A movement whose main promise is the relief from responsibility cannot but be antimoral in its effects, however lofty the ideals to which it owes its birth.
The root of this"revolt against self-responsibility in action," as psychologist Nathaniel Branden once said,"is the revolt against self-direction in thought." When a social system emerges that is inimical to this self-direction—a system that forbids individuals the capacity to function as rational, independent beings—"psychological and physical disaster is the result."
It is thus no coincidence that the triumph of fascism in Germany and Italy was so dependent on the molding of youthful minds. Lyttleton writes:
The cult of youth was one of fascism's most successful forms of propaganda; fascist supporters were distinguished from those of other parties more by their age than their class. But the cult of youth was not just useful to the Fascists. It was a logical consequence of fascism's martial ethic and ideology of permanent struggle. It was by the molding of the new generations through the youth movement that the creation of the"new man" [the similarities to"New Communist Man" are not coincidental either—CS] devoted to the Leader and the Movement and free from all social attachments was to be finally achieved.
If we are to draw any positive signs anywhere in the Middle East for a veritable freedom revolution, it is this: Emerging youth movements in Iran may very well become a bulwark against the theocratic authoritarianism that the mullahs represent in that country. Potentially, this internally generated movement in Iran would be far more effective in the long run in establishing indigenous democratic cultural patterns, than any externally generated U.S. molding of Iraq. On this, I am in agreement with Gus diZerega and have written extensively about the Iranian context.
I also agree fundamentally with Gus that
the best way to eliminate theocratic fantasies from the Arab world is to allow them to have theocracies in power if that is what a majority wants or is willing to accept—and best, by election. That legitimates the idea that the people should decide, and while they will initially decide poorly, the misrule thugs like that will institute will in time wither the ferocity of their theology and their commitment to mindless interpretations of scripture.
In clarifying a political concept such as fascism, we can only be strengthened; understanding what the threat is, and what the threat is not, we can redouble our efforts against those forces at home and abroad that would undermine our liberty.
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Pat Lynch
Roderick T. Long
Needless to say, my last post has generated a lot of feedback, both public and private, from both sides -- each explaining to me why the sins, if any, of its favoured camp are venial, while those of the other's favoured camp are mortal. I would prefer not to be drawn into evaluating the pros and cons of particular persons or policies -- both because doing so would go against the eirenic object of my post, and because, for reasons I explained last time, I regard such comparisons as largely a red herring. (Notice that I never said, and nothing in my post depended on saying, that the two sides were equivalent; assume that whichever side you think is worse really is worse, and my arguments still apply.) But I do want to comment on one particular issue.
Which is more problematic: seeking strategic association with powerful establishment promoters of statist evil, or seeking strategic association with powerless fringe promoters of statist evil? Half of my correspondents think the former is more problematic, on the grounds that establishment politicos are actually engaging in repression and mass murder right now, and it's worse to commit crimes than merely to advocate them; also, they argue that one is more likely to be corrupted into compromise by powerful pals than by powerless ones. The other half think the latter is more problematic, since there is an excuse for associating with the establishment folks (they set policy, they're widely respected and influential, so it's hard to avoid dealing with them), whereas there is no analogous case for associating with groups that, while perhaps no more intrinsically objectionable than the ruling class, are powerless (and so cannot offer as much aid, nor is there any pressing need to interact with them) and unpopular (and so are more likely to harm the reputation and public perception of those who associate with them).
In short, the very same power differential between the two types of statists is cited by Catoites as grounds for regarding Mises-style alliances as more suspect than Cato-style alliances, and is cited by Misesites as grounds for regarding Cato-style alliances as more suspect than Mises-style alliances. My reaction to this is that each side has a valid point; there is a respect in which Cato-style alliances are more problematic than Mises-style alliances, and there is a different respect in which Mises-style alliances are more problematic than Cato-style alliances. It seems to me that intelligent libertarians of good will could reasonably disagree about both the relative and the absolute weights of these two respects.
By"relative" I mean: which of the two respects is more problematic? By"absolute" I mean: which respect (one? both? neither?) is so problematic that its costs outweigh its benefits? When I call for peace I'm not calling for a consensus on the right answer to either the relative or the absolute question (nor have I suggested any such answers myself); I'm just suggesting that someone can reach the wrong answers to those questions and still be a valuable friend of liberty, worthy of respect. (I would also add that no organisation or movement should be judged solely by the most provocative persons in it, nor should those persons be judged solely by the most provocative things they happen to say.)
Pat Lynch
In the 1970's Ali and Joe Fraser went at it in a series of classic fights that showed a great contrast in fighting styles. Ali was his typical "float like a butterfly, sting like a bee" self moving and hitting. He never worked one part of his opponent, but instead showered him with hits from all over.
Fraser in contrast beat his opponent in a brawling style focusing on his body. Body shots are, in the long term, tough to overcome, but not as showy or dramatic to the casual fan as the Ali style.
Here goes. Ali is Kerry, bobbing and weaving. He hits, and ducks, he moves on. I'm not sure it works, but it sure looks better to the casual fan. Bush is Fraser. Same themes, working the body and beating his opponent on credibility and challenging him.
It's compelling stuff, and frankly much more entertaining than I would have guessed.
Chris Matthew Sciabarra
David T. Beito
The Institute is one of the leading voices of free market economics in the United Kingdom. The new link will help to extend our audience to a whole new class of readers.
I am sure that L and P contributing editor, Jim Otteson, who is author of Adam Smith's Marketplace of Life (published by Cambridge University Press), will be especially pleased by this long overdue change.
Wendy McElroy
2) Why I think Edwards will be increasingly viewed as the winner...Both men made errors but some of Cheney's statements make him look very bad. For example, the most damaging blow to Edwards came when Cheney stated that in all his years in the Senate he had never met Edwards before stepping on the stage for the debate. Cheney was referring to Edwards' record of non-attendance. it took CNN about ten minutes to find a 2001 photograph of Cheney and Edwards together. As the AP Wire states:"In perhaps the most awkward blooper of the evening, Cheney told Edwards to his face that they had never met before the debate, despite evidence they had. Edwards' campaign later provided a transcript of a February 2001 prayer breakfast at which Cheney began his remarks by acknowledging the North Carolina senator. The campaign said the two also met when Edwards accompanied the other North Carolina senator, Elizabeth Dole, to her swearing-in ceremony."
As for the images projected by the two men, I agree with the assessment of the anti-war site TruthOut:"Cheney was also every inch the snarling, hunch-shouldered golem that has made him one of the least popular politicians in recent memory. He seldom looked up at moderator Gwen Ifill, or at the cameras facing him, choosing instead to speak into his own chest for the entire night. Cheney appeared, overall, to cut quite the frightening figure, the dark night to Edwards' optimistic day." But I do not trust my own evaluation on this issue as I thoroughly detest Cheney.
Blogger Marc Perkel offers a good analysis of how the VP debate is being generally perceived. He writes,"BTW, It's interesting to see that Fox News has it more accurate than Microsoft NBC. Fox seems to know that Cheney got his ass kicked and trying to explain that. Microsoft NBC thinks Cheney won it in spite of the reality that Republicans are very unhappy tonight about the job Cheney did. The numbers I'm looking for is the audience size. How many people actually watched it because if the audience was high - then that's good for Kerry. That means that people were interested and that they got to see it first hand for themselves. What's interesting is that Microsoft NBC seems to disagree with its viewers. 70% give it to Edwards and 30% for Cheney. So I would say that Microsoft NBC is losing the debate with it's viewers. So - are all these online polls wrong? Do Democrats have more computers than Republicans? I agree that online polls are less scientific that GOP manipulated polls - but when it's so slanted in favor of Edwards - there has to be some reality there. CNN changed the question on their web site. Instead of asking who won - now they are asking if the debate will help you decide. CNN doesn't want to call it for Edwards who was winning 85 to 15 percent when CNM pulled the poll. I'm seeing far less polls tonight than I did last thursday. I see less that 1/3 of the polls last week. Seems to me that the news media doesn't want us to vote online any more because the voice of the people must be suppressed. CBS News running 87 Edwards - 20% Cheney. Fox News - with 119,000 votes Edwards winning 53% to 46%. And Fox is heavily biased towards Republicans. What this says is that Republicans know Edwards won it. Thanks to Fox for being a little more honest than NBC."
How important is the Edwards' victory? Not very, tho' any advantage shoud not be discounted in such a tight election. In the final analysis, I think the VP debate will be the most interesting by far of the four scheduled debates but also the least important by far.
For more commentary, please see McBlog.
Aeon J. Skoble
David T. Beito
Pat Lynch
Chris Matthew Sciabarra
Columnist Zev Chafets has been a strong supporter of the war in Iraq, but in a recent NY Daily News column, he argued that President Bush is suffering from delusions if he sincerely believes that freedom can grow in Iraqi soil."W's Wrong," Chafets asserts.
During [last] Thursday's presidential debate, President Bush told the American people his goal in Iraq is to spread liberty and freedom. The President believes the majority of Iraqis yearn for democracy and will express this by taking part in free elections and defending a representative government. This idea is Bush's main justification for the invasion of Iraq. It is the heart of his broader Middle Eastern policy. And regrettably, it is entirely wrong.
Chafets argues persuasively that, in general,"Arab civic culture ... is authoritarian, repressive and rooted in Islam." The member states of the Arab League understand that Islam is"more than just a religion; it is the focal point of Arab society, for Muslims and non-Muslims alike, permeating [Arab] culture at every level political, social and economic." As such, Islam"instructs its followers 'in all fields of life, whether they be social, economic or political,' and 'provides the Muslim with all he or she needs to know to live a good and pious life.'"
Key to this Muslim instruction is the unquestionable acceptance of authority."Islam, after all," explains Chafets,
means"submission." Father knows best. Tribal loyalty is prized. God's laws (and those who interpret them) must be honored. Blasphemy is a life-threatening offense. In this conformist world, democracy is both unknown and unnatural. Individual choice offends the divine order of society. Gender equality is an invitation to moral madness. Infidels are obviously inferior to believers. Locating ultimate sovereignty in"the people" instead of the Koran is a mockery of God.
The Bush administration presupposes that the Iraqi electorate's march to the polls will signify"a love of liberty or Iraqi democracy. On the contrary," Chafets observes,"they will vote to further the fortunes of their own narrow tribes and sects." (Alas, there is more similarity here between Iraqi tribalism and America's"democratic" interest-group liberalism than Chafets realizes.) For Chafets, the"national security" goal should simply be to implant"pro-American rulers." Considering the US track record of empowering such authoritarian"pro-American rulers" in the past (e.g., the Shah of Iran, the mujihadeen in Afghanistan, the Hussein regime itself in its war with post-Shah Iran), I'm not as confident as Chafets of the long-term wisdom of this approach. It is responsible, at least partially, for the growth of anti-American fervor in the Middle East.
Chafets is right when he suggests that not one of the member states of the Arab League is"remotely democratic." He's not quite correct, however, to keep using the preferred neoconservative phrase"Islamofascism" to describe the Arab world. (Victor Hanson uses this word regularly; see here, for example.) On one level, the very use of the word"fascism" to describe societies that draw their inspiration from pre-enlightenment patriarchal caliphate ideology is an anachronism. But there are other usage problems here. Let me explain.
An argument can be made that US political economy is a kind of neofascism or neomercantilism or"liberal corporatism" (take your pick) insofar as it embraces the same kind of symbiotic relationship between government and business that one has always found in historically fascist systems. I argue here, for example, that Ayn Rand and other libertarians have been correct to characterize the current US politico-economic context as the"new fascism," with broad statist implications for domestic and foreign policy. I have explained further that the economic essence of fascism is the union of business and government. Clearly, however, I am careful to draw a distinction between the old “fascism” and the “New Fascism”:
What unites them is the business-government “partnership.” What distinguishes them is that the first is authoritarian, while the second is more akin to “liberal corporatism.” It retains liberal institutions and democratic procedures, while keeping much of the business-government politico-economic alliance outside the sphere of democratic control. The whole panoply of regulatory agencies, central bank manipulations, and pressure group pork-barreling has been the result of an incremental process over many years, creating a whole complex structure of privilege that cannot be altered by simply changing the political party in power. The “New Fascism” may or may not entail nationalism and extreme regimentation, though in war time (both world wars come to mind), the U.S. fully embraced “War Collectivism” in the regimentation of industry, commerce, and finance, as well as the suppression of civil liberties. All the more reason to take very seriously the consequences of a long-term policy of perpetual war.
Fascism does not entail broad economy-wide central planning, like state socialism. But cartelized banking is a key component in the nexus of"ultimate decision-making."
The system has varying degrees of centralization in different sectors and industries, but this is usually the product of ad hoc, patchwork regulation that, over time, blocks market entry and creates various monopolistic rigidities. I’m certainly open to using a different label for what I’m seeking to describe, given how “loaded” the term fascism actually is. But whether we call it the “new fascism” or “neofascism” or “liberal corporatism” or “corporate welfare statism,” the result is the same: a politico-economic structure that has evolved to benefit certain groups at the expense of others.
Now, what of the Arab world? It is authoritarian. But it is a mongrel mixture of theocratic fundamentalism, quasi-socialist command economies dominated by state-monopoly control of key resources (such as oil), and hereditary monarchy. It's simply wrong to characterize this mongrel mixture in toto as"Islamofascism." Call it theocratic statism or theocratic authoritarianism or, for its more"secular" forms, monarchical-military dictatorship, but please don't call it"fascism." Not unless you mean something historically specific, as in the"guild socialist" arrangements of Benito Mussolini.
It must be emphasized that historically specific fascism does not necessarily entail institutionalized racism and anti-Semitism as in Hitler's Germany, but it certainly entails collectivism, tribal or otherwise. (I sometimes wonder if right-wing writers shy away from using the word"theocratic" to describe the fundamentalist Arab states because the word hits a little too close to home for some of them.)
Either way, every way, no matter which way you characterize it ... I think the essential argument that Chafets makes is unimpeachable, in my view:
What is too much is to expect an ancient society to embrace values and practices it neither understands nor approves of. If success in Iraq means enticing people to renounce a civic culture that flows from their deepest Islamic beliefs, then failure is guaranteed.
Pat Lynch
Roderick T. Long
No, not that one. (Though the two are related.) I'm talking about the war of insults and accusations between (people associated with, and/or sympathetic toward) the libertarian movement's two most influential think tanks, the Cato Institute and the Mises Institute -- a conflict that for a while looked like it was winding down, but now sadly seems to be heating up again. I won't link to the relevant posts or name specific names because I have no desire to fan the flames further; but as someone with ties to both organisations I feel a responsibility to say something about the issue. This will probably get me in trouble with both sides, but here goes.
a) Each side accuses the other side of taking some un-libertarian positions. For example, Catoites criticise Misesites for opposing immigration, while Misesites criticise Catoites for favouring vouchers. Well, first of all, neither institution is monolithic in this regard; not everyone at Cato is pro-voucher and not everyone at Mises supports border controls. Each of these groups is much more internally diverse than it appears when viewed, from a distance, by the other group. But second -- okay, I think each criticism is right as far as it goes. I think the anti-immigration position popular among Misesites is a mistaken application of libertarian principles; and I also think the pro-voucher position popular among Catoites is a mistaken application of libertarian principles. But I don't think either position is crazy, or something no intelligent libertarian of good will could hold. (And the same goes for many other policy issues that divide Catoites and Misesites.) After knowing, respecting, and learning from people in both camps, I find it hard to take seriously the accusations from either side that the other side is not sincerely libertarian.
b) Each side accuses the other side of engaging in personal attacks and of uncharitably distorting the other side's positions. Yes, I think both sides have been guilty of such unfairness. I may be told that one side did this first, or has done this more. Well, suppose that's right. As Rothbard would say (though not necessarily in this context!): so what? One doesn't excuse the other; it's unfortunate whoever does it, whenever and however much. Nor, however, do I find it plausible to suppose that either side is being deliberately dishonest in these distortions. When you think your opponent's position is fundamentally screwy, you are likely to be impatient at the prospect of sorting out the position's precise details.
c) Each side accuses the other side of cozying up to horribly anti-liberty groups. Catoites accuse Misesites of making common cause with the racist-homophobic-theocratic-populist right. Misesites accuse Catoites of selling out to the mass-murdering regulatory imperial Beltway establishment. Catoites are horrified when Misesites give banquets in honour of theocratic economists; Misesites are horrified when Catoites give banquets in honour of establishment politicians. Each demands to know why the other side doesn't denounce such folks instead of fêting them. (And each side is inclined to suppose, wrongly in my judgment, that the other side's expressions of horror are either instances of unaccountable looniness or else disingenuous, a cover for some hidden agenda. Again, I know the people on both sides too well to find such accusations plausible.) Well ... the forming of strategic alliances with nonlibertarian groups is a tricky matter. There's the attractive possibility not only of winning aid from statists but of influencing them in a libertarian direction. (Religious conservatives, for example, surely make less dangerous neighbours once they've been converted to anarchism.) On the down side, there's the risk of lending their anti-libertarian positions legitimacy, as well as the danger that influence can be a two-way street. Catoites and Misesites are each convinced that they're doing a good job of handling their own strategic alliances but that the other side has fallen to the dark side. (Murray Rothbard experimented with many different alliances -- Objectivists, Goldwater Republicans, New Leftists, moderate Democrats, paleoconservatives -- at different points in his career, and the Cato and Mises Institutes each partake of the character of whichever alliance Rothbard was pursuing at the time of their respective foundings.) I myself am not particularly comfortable with either the Beltway-style alliances or the paleo-style alliances (I'm personally more inclined toward the New Left sort of alliance that Rothbard was pushing in ’68 -- though I recognise that it has its perils as well); and I certainly don't think either side has negotiated its alliances flawlessly and without erroneous compromise. But I do think each side has been, in its own way, a powerful force for libertarian education, and I can't deny that these risky alliances have played a role in these organisations' success in advancing the cause of liberty.
In short, I am convinced that each side in this conflict tends to exaggerate its opponents' shortcomings, and to underplay arguably analogous shortcomings in its own record. Someday these two camps will put their quarrels behind them and unite; when they do, they will defeat the State. I fear the current wounds may run so deep that any such resolution will have to wait until all the current participants have died off; but I can always hope.
Gene Healy
Lessons from the Iraq War: Reconciling Liberty and Security
At this conference libertarians (and Objectivists and free-market conservatives) will debate the principles that should guide foreign policy, the lessons of the Iraq war, and how freedom and foreign policy are related. Speakers will include Nick Gillespie, Deroy Murdock, James Robbins, John Mueller, Brink Lindsey, Robert Higgs, Ron Bailey, Shibley Telhami, Ed Hudgins, Chuck Pena, and Chris Preble. In this case, folks, when we say"debate," we mean it. Expect sharp clashes on every panel.
It will be webcast for you out-of-towners, but really, who wants to sit in front of a computer screen for 8 hours? Get on a plane already.
Details here.
William Marina
http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1372
David T. Beito
As promised, I am posting another one of the anti-New Deal cartoons of the mysterious “L. Rogers" from The Chicago Defender. This one is from April 21, 1934. Although the NRA is in the title, the main focus is on the negative impact of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration on blacks. The Defender was the leading black newspaper in the United States.
David Bernstein at Volokh has commented on the earlier cartoon posted on the NRA.
Bernstein is the author of Only One Place of Redress, which deals with the impact of government regulations on blacks during this period.
These cartoons were part of a larger pattern. As noted earlier, the Defender
strongly applauded the U.S. Supreme Court when it struck down the NRA as unconstitutional in 1935.
Many thanks to Rick Shenkman at POTUS for his patience in helping me to scan and post these photos!
