Lincoln Catches up with the War
Author's Note: The following article is in response to some controversy generated by the ending of my book The Confederacy's Last Northern Offensive: Jubal Early, the Army of the Valley, and the Raid on Washington. The next to the last sentence refers to Abraham Lincoln's often confusing stance on Emancipation; the last sentence refers to some of the results of the Civil War. The book contains support for the ending; Chapter 1 discusses the sacrifices Northern civilians made; Chapter 10 talks about the changes in America's financial system caused by the war; the income tax, the introduction of the"greenback," and the burgeoning national debt. However, the following article will further clarify the ending.
Conditions and unforeseen consequences created by the Civil War, and Abraham Lincoln’s beliefs about slavery, were in large measure responsible for his changing stance on Emancipation. In the late 1850’s, Lincoln established his anti-slavery views; as president, he belatedly supported Emancipation, but only after battlefield events, home front difficulties, and Congressional action created conditions that made it necessary.
Especially as a result of his debates with Stephen A. Douglas, Lincoln had become well-known for his anti-slavery stance. Indeed, in one debate he stated, “I believe this government cannot endure, permanently half-slave and half-free…It will become all one thing, or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery, will arrest the further spread of it…or its advocates shall push it forward….” In the late 1850s, Lincoln believed that if the expansion of slavery was strongly resisted, it would be isolated in the states where it was legal, and that in time, it would disappear by itself. He further believed that slavery “would not outlive the century.” Yet as President, Lincoln stated many times, to the effect that if slave-owners would swear allegiance to the Union, they could keep their slaves. (1) Lincoln further explained, in an August 1862 letter to Horace Greeley, written after the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, “My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that. What I do about slavery, and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union.”
Thus as the war began, and long afterwards, many were confused about Lincoln’s position on slavery and emancipation. Lincoln himself was not above confusion. Further complicating matters, most people, Lincoln included, expected the war to last several months, perhaps a year, resulting in a tidy and on-schedule Union victory, after which slavery, still intact, would be dealt with. No one, Lincoln included, had any idea that the war would turn into a nightmarish and devastating cataclysm that would last four years, kill 620,000 troops, Union and Confederate, at least 50,000 Southern civilians, and completely destroy the South. One writer has stated that this misperception was “the biggest political miscalculation in American history.”
By August 1864, Lincoln was so desperate to end the slaughter, that he seriously considered abandoning emancipation entirely. The war would forever change the relationship between American citizens and their government, which Lincoln wanted, but which few foresaw. (2)
Thus Lincoln began the war viewing slavery as a negotiable issue—not seriously considering emancipation, except as something that needed to happen gradually, and apart from the war. To this end, in December 1861, he had George Fisher, an anti-slavery Delaware Democrat, introduce a compensated emancipation bill in that state’s legislature, with the goal of ending slavery in Delaware by 1872. The plan passed in the House, but failed in the Delaware Senate by one vote. (3)
Throughout the spring of 1862, Lincoln sided with Democrats and some moderate Republicans, who supported the war on the basis of bringing the country back together—“saving the Union,” to use his phrase. Fearful of border state secession, Lincoln continued to support border state politicians, who were strongly opposed to emancipation. However, battlefield events and home front difficulties pushed him closer to the Radical position on emancipation. After the war began, increasing numbers of slaves left their masters, and began to follow the Union armies, and were employed as cooks and laborers. Major General Benjamin Butler made the first coherent response, stating that because the South had left the Union, the Fugitive Slave Law no longer applied, calling the runaways “contraband of war.” The term “contrabands” stuck, and thereafter many Union troop units gave refuge to runaway slaves. Secretary of War Simon Cameron, in a December 1861 report, proposed arming the runaways and training them as soldiers. A surprised Lincoln recalled the report and ordered Cameron to delete the suggestion, then fired him, contributing to the widening gulf between himself and the Radicals. On March 9, 1862, Major General David Hunter, commanding Union forces in coastal South Carolina, issued a proclamation declaring slaves in that area free. Lincoln promptly nullified the proclamation and rebuked Hunter. On March 13th, Congress passed a new article of war, forbidding federal officers to return fugitive slaves to their masters. Nevertheless, the failure to implement the draft in 1862, and lackluster Northern recruiting efforts, underscored the need for a steady supply of manpower for the Union army.
However, after a string of Confederate victories, beginning with the July 1861 rebel victory at First Manassas, official Washington eagerly anticipated McClellan’s spring offensive against Richmond, expecting that city’s capture by the Army of the Potomac. Reality crushed their hopes, as McClellan was soundly defeated in the Peninsular campaign. In response, as July began, the Radical Republican-dominated Congress passed a law that provided for a draft of state militia troops, and authorized the president to “enroll persons of African descent,” for “any war service for which they may be found competent,” that included service as soldiers. This bill also signaled a turn towards total war, confiscating—and in practice, destroying—Southern property, culminating in the Confiscation Act of July 1862. One writer states that “…the confiscation act was important as a symbol of what the war was becoming—a war to overturn the southern social order as a means of reconstructing the Union.” (4) The eventual result was a far cry from “the Union as it was,” that went much further than most “saving the Union” advocates envisioned.
However, on July 8, Lincoln visited McClellan at his Harrison’s Landing headquarters. McClellan told the president, “Neither confiscation of property nor forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated…It should not be a war upon population, but against armed forces…A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies.” McClellan’s views, and continued resistance to forcible abolition (confiscation of Southern property) by border state politicians convinced Lincoln of the need for an Emancipation Proclamation, which he decided on on July 13, 1862. The preliminary Emancipation Proclamation followed nine days later; Lincoln made it public on September 22, five days after the stalemate at Antietam.
Upon publication of the Emancipation Proclamation, no border states seceded. However, his lack of reaction to the news of the September 29 murder of a Union general, William “Bull” Nelson, indicated Lincoln’s commitment to emancipation, and to increasing Republican presence in the army. Nelson was an anti-Emancipation Democrat, fighting to “save the Union.” His commander was another Democrat, Major General Don Carlos Buell; his brother Thomas was a good friend of the president. However, Oliver P. Morton, the violent Radical Republican Governor of Indiana, used Nelson’s spat with Brigadier General Jefferson C. Davis (no relation to the Confederate president), as a pretext to cause a confrontation between the two in the lobby of Louisville’s Galt Hotel. Davis shot Nelson in the chest at close range; he died shortly thereafter. Most of the cabinet wanted Davis court-martialed. Lincoln, however, remained silent when Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, at a cabinet meeting, dismissed that suggestion. (5)
Lincoln called the Emancipation Proclamation a “war measure,” but in practice, it was unenforceable in those areas controlled by Confederate armies, thus it didn’t free any slaves. Nevertheless, it was a much better way than confiscation, to solve the dilemma of runaway slaves. The above-mentioned militia act gave the president authority to “enroll persons of African descent” into the army, thus the Proclamation contained a provision opening the Union army to enlistment, by and for former slaves, giving them the opportunity to fight for their country. Also, the Proclamation took courage and conviction to publish. Because of it, the Republicans lost badly in the 1862 Congressional elections." Historians differ as to his entire motivation for publishing it, but Lincoln will always be known as the Great Emancipator.
However, one writer has called Lincoln “the Great Centralizer,” and he should forever be known as that as well. Because of the war that Lincoln wanted, refusing Southern peace overtures, and baiting the South into starting the fighting, federal government power expanded exponentially; and the Federal government enacted measures and practices that are with us today. (6)
High protectionist tariffs; government subsidies of private business ventures—with a resulting huge increase in corruption; the income tax; the “Greenback”; and a greatly expanded federal government presence in America’s financial life—all owe much to the impetus of the Civil War. As a Whig, and later a Republican, and a devotee of Henry Clay and his “American System,” Lincoln desired high protectionist tariffs, government subsidies of private business ventures, and a greatly expanded federal government. One result of an expanded government was the subjugation of the Plains Indians, at the behest of the government subsidized Union Pacific and Central Pacific railroad companies. These companies went bankrupt immediately after the completion of the transcontinental railroad in 1869 because their directors were stealing from company accounts. The resulting Credit Mobilier fiasco impoverished President Grant and nearly brought down his administration.
Another result of a consolidated federal government was a greatly strengthened army and navy with a corresponding expansion overseas. These include the acquisition of Hawaii, part of Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and a naval base in the Philippines. Therefore, much of Lincoln’s legacy was, in fact, runaway greed, endless corruption, and a quest for empire. This spoiled Northern victory, ignored George Washington’s warnings, and eventually tarnished American freedom. (7)
1-Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation: The End of Slavery in America, by Allen C. Guelzo (New York: Simon & Schuster 2004), 23-25
2-The Real Lincoln: A New Look at Abraham Lincoln, His Agenda, and an Unnecessary War, by Thomas J. DiLorenzo (New York: Crown Books 2003), 259, 260; Emancipating Slaves, Enslaving Free Men: AHistory of the American Civil War, by Jeffrey Rogers Hummel (Chicago: Open Court 1996), 279; Lincoln to C.D. Robinson, 8/17/1864, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query
3-Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, 54-59
4-Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, by James M. McPherson (New York: Oxford University Press 1988), 259
5-Article, The Murder of Major General Nelson, by Thomas Fleming
6-DiLorenzo, The Real Lincoln, Chapter 9
7-The Tariff History of the United States, by Frank Taussig (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons 1923), 155-489; DiLorenzo, The Real Lincoln Chapters 4, 9, 10